Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries

Law Journals

8-2-2018

Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 53 (Aug. 2, 2018) (en banc)
Shady Sirsy

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs
Part of the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Sirsy, Shady, "Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 53 (Aug. 2, 2018) (en banc)" (2018). Nevada Supreme
Court Summaries. 1177.
https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/1177

This Case Summary is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional repository
administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please
contact youngwoo.ban@unlv.edu.

Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 53 (Aug. 2, 2018) (en banc)1
CRIMINAL LAW: DEATH PENALTY APPEAL
Summary
The Court held that the appellant’s petition challenging his conviction for two firstdegree murders and death sentences was both untimely and successive. Further, it affirmed the
district court’s denial of the appellant’s petition as procedurally barred and determined that
Rippo did not show good cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural bars to his petition. The
United States Supreme Court vacated the Court’s opinion and remanded for further proceedings,
reasoning that the Court applied the wrong legal standard as to Rippo’s judicial bias claim. On
reconsideration, the Court held that an evidentiary hearing was required with respect to several
issues related to the judicial bias claim. Moreover, it affirmed the remainder of the district
court’s order but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the judicial bias claim.
Background
Michael Damon Rippo and his girlfriend, Diana Hunt, devised a plan to rob two women,
Denise Lizzi and Lauri Jacobson. The bodies of Lizzi and Jacobson were found in Jacobson’s
apartment on February 20, 1992. According to Hunt’s testimony, Rippo carried out his plan to
rob the victims by using a stun gun to subdue them, binding and gagging them, and then
strangling them. Rippo tried to conceal the evidence and stole the victim’s car and credit cards,
which he used to make purchases later. After Hunt suggested that they turn themselves in, Rippo
told his girlfriend that he had returned to the apartment to cut the victim’s throats and jump on
their bodies. Witnesses provided testimony linking Rippo to property taken from the women and
a medical examiner testified that Lizzi’s injuries were consistent with strangulation. However,
none of the victims’ bodies revealed evidence of stun gun marks.
Rippo was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and related felonies and
sentenced to death in 1996. The convictions were affirmed on appeal and he was denied relief in
a postconviction petition. He filed a second postconviction petition for a writ of habeas in state
court, which was denied for being untimely and successive. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Nevada concluded that Rippo filed his petition within a reasonable time after the postconvictioncounsel claims became available, but the claims lacked merit. The Court rejected his other
allegations of good cause and prejudice and affirmed the district court’s decision to deny the
petition as procedurally barred. Upon granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court held
that standard for recusal was whether risk of bias was too high to be constitutionally tolerable
and proceeded to vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.
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Discussion
This matter is before this Court on remand from the United States Supreme Court.2
Rippo’s petition raised claims for relief based on trial error, prosecutorial misconduct and failure
to disclose evidence, ineffective assistance of trial counsel, ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel, and ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel. Rippo acknowledged the petition
was not filed within the time period permitted by NRS 34.726(1) and was subject to various
procedural defaults under NRS 34.810. He provided several explanations for these failures, but
the district court dismissed the petition. In reviewing the district court’s application of the
procedural default rules, this Court gives deference to the court’s factual findings but reviews the
court’s application of the law to those facts de novo.3
Ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel as cause and prejudice to excuse a procedural
default
The opinion focused on Rippo’s allegations that counsel appointed to represent him in his
first postconviction proceeding provided ineffective assistance. The right to effective assistance
of postconviction counsel is only recognized where appointment is statutorily mandated.4 In this
case, the right did apply. The ineffective counsel claims involved two contexts: (1) a freestanding
claim for relief from his conviction and sentence and (2) an ineffective assistance claim
establishing “cause and prejudice” to excuse the procedural defaults of his claims.5 Three
procedural bars set by statute are relevant to the analysis of the contexts: the second-orsuccessive-petition,6 the waiver bar,7 and the time bar.8
Successive petitions and abuse of the writ
The Court examined statutory provisions that limit second or successive habeas petitions
that challenge a judgment of conviction or sentence. A petition is dismissed in either of two
circumstances: (1) if “it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and . . . the prior
determination was on the merits” or (2) “if new and different grounds are alleged” and the court
finds that the petitioner’s failure “to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse
of the writ.”9 Here, Rippo’s prior petition was resolved on the merits and all of the grounds in
Rippo’s second petition had been raised in the prior petition or were new and different grounds
for relief. Consequently, the second petition was subject to dismissal under the statute, absent a
showing of cause and prejudice.10
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Failure to raise claims in prior proceedings
Petitions are subject to dismissal if they raise grounds that could have been raised in a
prior proceeding.11 The default may be excused by a showing of cause for the failure to present
and actual prejudice. Here, the grounds raised in Rippo’s petition could have been raised in the
prior proceeding and are thus subject to dismissal.
Procedural default of cause-and-prejudice claim
To excuse the procedural default of claims under NRS 34.810(1)(b) and (2) the petition
must show “an impediment external to the defense” prevented them from presenting the claims
previously or warrants presenting them again. Rippo primarily relied on his ineffective assistance
claim for this purpose. However, an ineffective assistance claim that has been procedurally
defaulted cannot be used to excuse the procedural default of another claim. Under NRS
34.726(1), Rippo’s ineffective assistance claim was procedurally defaulted and thus could not be
used.
Availability of postconviction-counsel claim and time within which it must be raised
Under NRS 34.726(1), a habeas petition challenging a conviction or sentence must be
filed within one year after entry, or if appealed, within a year after the court issues its remittitur
on direct appeal from the judgment of conviction.12 Rippo’s petition was not filed within that
time and he was required to show good cause to excuse the delay. A showing of good cause
requires (1) that the delay was not the petitioner’s fault and (2) the dismissal would unduly
prejudice the petitioner.13 Rippo asserted that the delay was due to ineffective assistance of
postconviction counsel and that claim was not available at time of procedural default.
The Court agreed his claim was not available because the claim’s basis depends on the
conclusion of postconviction proceedings, which occurred outside of the time period. The claims
unavailability was not enough because it must also be within “a reasonable time” after the claim
becomes available. To determine what is reasonable the Court had to answer: (1) when a
postconviction ineffective assistance claim becomes available and (2) what is a reasonable time
thereafter to file a petition raising the claim. The Court determined that under the first prong, a
claim became available at conclusion of postconviction proceedings and that proceeding
concluded when the court issued its remittitur in the postconviction appeal. Under the second
prong, an ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel claim has been raised in a reasonable
time after it became available so long as the post-conviction petition is filed within one year after
entry of the district court’s order disposing of the prior postconviction petition or, if appealed,
within one year after the remittitur. Because Rippo filed his petition within a reasonable time as
required for the first component of NRS 34.726(1), the Court determined Rippo met the first
component of the good-cause showing.
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Undue prejudice to excuse untimely petition based on ineffective assistance of postconviction
counsel and standard for evaluating postconviction counsel's effectiveness
The second component of the good-cause showing under NRS 34.726(1) requires the
petitioner to demonstrate dismissal if the petition unduly prejudices him or that his claim has
merit for it to prejudice him. To determine the merit of his claim, the Court took the opportunity
to “explicitly adopt the Strickland standard to evaluate postconviction counsel’s performance
where there is a statutory right to effective assistance of that counsel.” 14 The Strickland standard
has two factors that require the petitioner to demonstrate: (1) counsel’s performance was
deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.15 The prejudice prong in the
context of postconviction counsel requires a showing that counsel’s deficient performance
prevented the petitioner from establishing “that the conviction was obtained, or that the sentence
was imposed, in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of
this State.”16 If the petitioner surmounts Strickland’s high bar, and proves postconviction
counsel’s ineffective assistance, the claim meets the undue-prejudice component of the goodcause showing required under NRS 34.726(1).
Actual prejudice to excuse procedural default under NRS 34.810 based on ineffective assistance
of postconviction counsel
A postconviction-counsel claim is sufficient to establish cause to excuse the procedural
default of another claim if the petitioner proves both prongs of the ineffective-assistance test.17 If
the prejudice standard under Strickland is met, then the actual prejudice standard to excuse
procedural default has also been met. Here, Rippo did not meet both prongs of the ineffectiveassistance test with respect to post conviction counsel and therefore did not demonstrate cause
and prejudice to excuse the applicable procedural bars. While, Rippo did raise his
postconviction-counsel claims within a reasonable time, he failed to demonstrate the undue
prejudice required to excuse the procedural defaults.
Judicial bias (claim 1)
Rippo alleged that his convictions and death sentences are invalid because the trial judge
was biased and that his counsel was ineffective because they failed to adequately challenge the
trial judge’s alleged bias. He argues that the district court erred in applying the procedural default
and the law-of-the-case doctrine to this claim. The judicial bias claim was based on allegations
that the trial judge: (1) was the subject of a federal investigation at the time of trial, (2) knew the
Clark County District Attorney’s Office and/or Las Vegas Metropolitan Department were
involved but failed to disclose the fact, and (3) was acquainted with a trial witness, Denny
Mason, but did not disclose the fact because it would have incriminated the judge in the federal
investigation.
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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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The law-of-the-case doctrine generally precludes further litigation of this issue but Rippo
claimed that it should not apply because the facts are different than they were at appeal and the
prior decision was based on the State’s false representations. The Court determined that there
were no substantially different facts that would warrant an exception to the law-of-the-case
doctrine. The allegations were raised in Rippo’s opening brief on direct appeal and were rejected.
However, under the United States Supreme Court’s directive, this Court’s prior decision became
irrelevant. On the merits of the judicial-bias claim, the inquiry is "whether, considering all the
circumstances alleged, the risk of bias was too high to be constitutionally tolerable." 18 This Court
found the answer may be yes, that Rippo's allegations that the trial judge knew about the State's
involvement in the federal sting operation but lied about it and falsely denied that he had any
connection to Mason or his business partner to avoid implicating himself in the federal bribery
investigation are true. Because the substantive claim therefore may have merit based on the new
information, this Court determined that discovery and an evidentiary hearing is needed to
determine whether the allegations supporting the judicial-bias claim are true, and if so, whether
prior postconviction counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and reassert the judicial-bias claim.
Prosecutorial misconduct (claims 2 and 9)
Rippo raised numerous allegations of prosecutorial misconduct including: the State
violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)(claim 2); the State failed to correct false
testimony by its witnesses (claim 2); the State failed to disclose and misrepresented its
involvement in the federal investigation of the trial judge (claim 2); the prosecutors made
improper arguments to the jury (claim 2); and the State intimidated a defense witness (claim 9).
The district court determined that both claims 2 and 9 were procedurally defaulted and that
several of the misconduct allegations were subject to the law-of-the-case doctrine.19
Brady allegations
Rippo claims that the State withheld evidence in violation of Brady, which could have
been used to impeach several of the State’s witnesses, including Thomas Sims, Thomas Christos,
and Michael Beaudoin. Brady requires that a prosecutor disclose evidence favorable to the
defense when it is material to guilt or to punishment. To establish a Brady violation the
defendant must show (1) the State withheld evidence, (2) favorable to the accused because it is
exculpatory or impeaching, and (3) the prejudice resulted because the evidence was material.20
The Brady allegations associated with Sims and Christos focused on whether the State
withheld evidence of cooperation agreements. A promise made by prosecution to a key witness
in exchange for testimony requires disclosure under Brady. The Court determined that Rippo’s
allegations of favorable dispositions involving Sims and Christos could not establish explicit or
tacit agreements between the State and the witnesses. Thus, the Brady claim as to these witnesses
was not sufficient to establish cause and prejudice. The Brady allegations involving Beaudoin
were similar but Rippo offered additional specific allegations. Rippo submitted a declaration in
18
19
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Rippo IV, 580 U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 907.
See Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 315, 535 P.2d 797, 798 (1975).
State v. Bennett, 119 Nev. 589, 599, 81 P.3d 1, 8 (2003).
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which Beaudoin indicated he was arrested on felony drug charges and he was contacted by one
the attorneys prosecuting Rippo. According to the declaration after the call, his charges were
reduced.1 and he was able to avoid going to prison. The Court determined that the information
was not enough to be material under Brady because the prosecution did not offer a tacit or
explicit promise. The Court concluded the Brady claim lacked merit and could not establish
cause and prejudice that his postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this Brady
claim.
False testimony
Rippo’s alleged that false testimony evidence could excuse the procedural default of his
claims. Rippo asserted that three jailhouse informants (David Levine, James Ison, and Donald
Hill) gave false testimony. He alleges that prosecutors or police provided Levine and Ison with
information about the case to make their testimony appear more credible and that by doing so the
prosecution knowingly presented false or misleading testimony. However, this claim was
procedurally barred. Rippo asserted two arguments to excuse the combat that bar that were
rejected – (1) the alleged withholding of evidence by the state was rejected as insufficient
because Rippo would have known any falsity in the testimony at the time the witness testified
and (2) the ineffective assistance of counsel to excuse procedural bars was rejected because the
district court determined he was not prejudiced as Rippo admitted to his involvement in the
murders. The Court determined that the claim lacks merit because the information could have
been used to impeach the witnesses, but it would not have affected the jury’s verdict nor was
there a reasonable probability of a different outcome had the information been disclosed. Rippo’s
allegations regarding Hill are different in that they affect a partial recantation. The Court
determined that Hill’s postconviction declaration did not suggest the prosecution knew or had
reason to know part of his testimony was false. Thus, Hill’s testimony also does not demonstrate
the district court erred in determining Rippo did not demonstrate good cause and prejudice to
excuse procedural default.
Prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument
Rippo also asserted that the prosecutors committed misconduct during the guilt and
penalty phase argument. The allegations were raised and rejected on direct appeal thus the Court
determined they are barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine. The Court also rejected Rippo’s
suggestion that he has good cause because of cumulative errors because it was previously
determined that there was no error. The Court concluded that Rippo did not demonstrate any
misconduct by the prosecutors and thus his postconviction-counsel claim also lacks merit.
Witness intimidation
The Court rejected the allegations of improper witness intimidation (claim 9) on direct
appeal and thus concluded that it was precluded by the law-of-the-case doctrine.21
Failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence (claim 3)

21
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Rippo argued that the district court erred in procedurally defaulting his claim that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence. To excuse the
procedural default, Rippo asserts that postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
the trial-counsel claim. The Court determined that the claim was not enough to excuse the
procedural default because it did not meet either prong of the Strickland test.
Rippo claimed that his postconviction counsel was ineffective because they did not assert
an ineffective assistance claim based on trial counsel’s failure present evidence that he suffered
from a neuropsychological impairment. The Court determined that the psychological evaluations
available to counsel did not reveal any major disorders and thus did not render the counsel
ineffective for failure to seek additional evaluations. Rippo’s postconviction counsel claim based
on trial counsel’s failure to present a violence risk assessment expert was rejected because Rippo
would have been subject to cross examination with evidence he threatened to kill a prison guard.
Thus, the claim lacked merit. Rippo also asserted a postconviction counsel claim based on trial
counsel’s failure to present evidence.
Rippo was sexually and physically abused. Trial counsel did present some of this
evidence, but Rippo argued that they failure to adequately investigate and uncover more
evidence. Trial counsel has a duty to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s
background. The Court concluded that trial counsels’ questions to Stacie (defendant’s sister who
testified on his childhood) and their failure to encourage her to be more detailed about the abuse
was not outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. The Court was less
confident regarding the more general allegation that trial counsel failed to interview and present
testimony of other family members. However, Stacie’s testimony and the letter counsel read into
the record from Rippo’s mother suggested that no one led the trial counsel to believe there was
more significant physical or sexual abuse. Further, Rippo did not allege he informed trial counsel
about the abuse. Consequently, the Court determined Rippo did not overcome the presumption
that trial counsel’s performance was within the range of professionally competent assistance.
The Court also decided to consider the prejudice prong and were not convinced that
“there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance”
between life and death.22 The Court noted that they characterize mitigating evidence as not
particularly compelling and determined the additional mitigating evidence did not add anything
compelling enough to conclude there was a reasonable probability that at least one juror would
have struck a different balance in choosing between life and death. As the Court determined the
omitted trial-counsel claim lacked merit, he did not have cause to excuse the procedural default
of that claim based on ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel. Rippo’s claim that
counsel should have argued specific mitigating circumstances and requested a special verdict
was rejected, as it was a strategic decision by counsel, which is virtually unchallengeable.23
Disclosure of records (claim 8)

22

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537 (2003).
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Rippo argued that the district court erred in dismissing his claim related to the trial
court’s decision to quash a subpoena for record that were in the possession of Parole and
Probation. He argued that the trial court infringed on his constitutional right to present a defense
and confront the witnesses against him, that trial counsel failed to "adequately litigate the
disclosure of the records," and that appellate counsel should have raised the issue on direct
appeal. To excuse the procedural default of these claims, Rippo asserted that prior postconviction
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise them. The Court concluded that the postconvictioncounsel claim lacks merit, consequently defaulting the trial-error and ineffective-assistance
claims.
Actual innocence
When petitioner cannot demonstrate cause and prejudice, the district court can still
excuse a procedural bar if the petitioner demonstrates that failing to consider the merits of any
constitutional claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Rippo claimed that he
was ineligible because the three aggravating circumstances supporting his death sentence are
invalid. Rippo claimed that the evidence supporting the torture aggravating circumstance was
deficient. The Court rejected this claim on direct appeal and further concluded that it was without
merit because there was evidence the stun gun was used for a purely sadistic purpose. Rippo
claimed that the other two aggravating circumstances are invalid for two reasons. The first
argument was that his prior conviction was the product of an invalid guilty plea, which the court
rejected based on review of the record. The second argument that his prior conviction should not
be used as an aggravating circumstance because he was only 16 years old at the time was
rejected based on Roper.
The Court concluded that Roper only addressed whether a death sentence can be imposed
for an offense committed before the defendant was 18,24 and as the murders were committed
while Rippo was a week from his 27th birthday, the aggravating circumstances were valid.
Therefore, as the aggravating circumstances were valid the Court determined that Rippo had not
demonstrated he was ineligible for the death penalty.
Conclusion
The Nevada Supreme Court determined that Michael Damon Rippo is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing as to the first claim in his petition but that his other claims lack merit. The
Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the district court for further
proceedings.
Dissent
PICKERING, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Justice Pickering would remand not just for discovery and an evidentiary hearing but also
briefing and argument on the mandate rule as it applies to Rippo's judicial bias claim. She
believes that the reading of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Rippo v. Baker is not clear. Her
24
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colleagues read it as Rippo not being able to prevail without establishing ineffective assistance of
first postconviction counsel. However, another reading of the U.S. Supreme Court's Rippo
opinion is that, because a judge's unconstitutional failure to recuse violates due process and
constitutes structural error, and because a now vacated decision resolved Rippo's appeal partly
based on law-of-the-case, Rippo may be entitled to a new trial if he can show the State defeated
Rippo's original judicial bias claim by falsely denying its involvement in the investigation of the
judge.
CHERRY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Justice Cherry concurred with the majority's decision that when postconviction counsel is
appointed pursuant to NRS 34.820, a challenge to that counsel's representation becomes
available upon the conclusion of the first postconviction proceeding. He further agreed with the
majority's adoption of the two-prong test in Strickland to evaluate claims of ineffective
assistance of postconviction counsel. However, he disagreed with the majority's decision that a
petition raising a claim of ineffective assistance of first postconviction counsel is filed within a
reasonable time if it is entered within one year after the district court's order disposing of the
prior petition or, if a timely appeal is taken from the district court's order, within one year after
issuance of remittitur.
He believed that Rippo had produced sufficient support entitling him to an evidentiary
hearing to prove his allegations that postconviction counsel provided ineffective assistance by
failing to investigate and challenge trial counsel's performance. If Rippo is successful in proving
allegations at an evidentiary hearing, he may secure a new penalty hearing.
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